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Introduction
H
istorians agree that bringing inflation under 
control became a crucial challenge for western 
governments in the 1970s and opened a space 
for experimentation to neoliberal policy. But inflation did 
not appear out of the blue with the oil crises. Widespread 
price rises were a current and persistent phenomenon 
since the postwar years. The difference was that 
interventionist states had managed to keep it 
contained and considered inflation to be a mi-
nor problem compared to growth, employment, 
and distribution. In contrast, from the 1970s 
price increases climbed and the battle against in-
flation became one of the main public and polit-
ical concerns.
Studies on inflation have been more or 
less monopolized by economists. As their pri-
mary purpose was to treat and eradicate infla-
tion on the basis of a quantitative method and 
a general theory of action, little was done to 
understand how individuals, families, enterprises, re-
tailers, and associations experienced, understood, and 
acted upon it. Although scarce, the contribution of 
other social sciences can be divided into four groups. 
Political scientists researched the impact of inflation 
on governments’ legitimacy and stability, usually from 
a comparative perspective (Paldam 1987; Smith, Dua, 
and Taylor 1994). They also revealed how inflation be-
came a weighting factor for the adoption of market 
reforms (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2004). Cultural and 
media studies analysed the place of experts, media 
coverage and event framing (Mata and Lemercier 
2010; Harrington 1989). For macro-sociologists, infla-
tion was associated with distributive conflicts, stress-
ing its social and political causes (Baumgartner and 
Burns 1980). In addition, they studied the relevance 
attributed to inflation by different social groups (Hibbs 
1979; Mora and Araujo 1988; Araujo 1993). Finally, 
historians, ethnographers, and qualitative sociologists 
considered the experience of drastic price increase in 
daily life (for inflation from 1945–1955, see Elena 
2012; for hyperinflation in the 1980s, Neiburg 2006; 
Sigal and Kessler 1996–1997).
As pieces of a complex puzzle, these contribu-
tions indicate the multifaceted nature of inflation but 
they still respect a clear distinction between economy, 
politics, and society. By setting these disciplinary 
boundaries aside, a long-term socio-history of infla-
tion could reveal how societies experienced, framed, 
and fought price disorder in the second half of the 
twentieth century.
From an economist’s perspective, inflation is 
considered a problem because it disrupts currency 
value and pricing schemes. Both mediate in establish-
ing equivalence among goods and services, indicate 
costs and rewards, enable decentralized calculation, 
and therefore permit the coordination of economic 
transactions and the planning of mid-term invest-
ments. In short, prices are crucial sources of informa-
tion for market economies. Nevertheless, as Polanyi 
(1957 [1944]) has stressed, the economy, as a self-reg-
ulating domain, is a historical invention. As Callon 
(1998) has pointed out, its existence requires a series of 
operations of disentanglement of goods and services 
in which economic science plays an active role. While 
this process has been observed in several specific mar-
kets, inflation offers a prime field to study a macro-so-
cial process of distinction and separation that marked 
the passage between welfare to neoliberal states.
Our argument is that, if we suspend disciplinary 
distinctions, inflation reveals two contrasting modes of 
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representing the economy. At least in Argentina, the 
growing concern about inflation is related to the con-
solidation of price indexes and the rise of economists as 
primary actors in public and political life.1 Numbers 
and experts did not just add new terminology and in-
terpreters to inflation analyses, they completely changed 
the way societies and authorities act to tame price rises. 
Transcending the debate about the political and 
economic significance of this phenomenon, Michel 
Foucault helps us to understand inflation as a problem 
of government (McCormack 2015). The French phi-
losopher showed how public and physical punishment 
was gradually replaced by more sophisticated, private 
and disembodied strategies of control and manage-
ment. In his lectures of 1978–1979 at the College de 
France, Foucault affirms that, in neoliberal regimes, to 
govern will increasingly mean to conduct individual 
behaviours “under the way and model of the econ-
omy” (Foucault 2008 and [1978–1979] 2012, 121). In-
stead of making use of physical violence, surveillance 
and moral judgments, governments stimulate “eco-
nomic agents” to freely calculate their costs and bene-
fits in order to align social conduct with socio-politi-
cal objectives (Miller and Rose 2008). Some critics 
have pointed out (Harvey 2005) that repressive forces 
have not been abandoned to the same degree in all so-
cial domains. What interests us here is how the econ-
omy emerged as a sphere within which individual self-
ish actions were not only permitted but also encour-
aged to be coordinated “at a distance” (Latour, 1987). 
While economists contributed to “make [their] world” 
(Mitchell 2005), numbers provided an “objectivation 
of equivalences”, enabling calculations for “multiple 
decision centres” (Desrosières 2008, 12).
Argentina is a country unmatched globally in 
terms of its history of inflation. Even for a continent 
that has suffered high and persistent levels of price in-
crease, Argentina constitutes an extreme example of 
an inflationist society: no other country has presented 
such high levels of inflation and for so long (Schvarzer 
1998). Since the 1940s, Argentinian inflation has been 
consistently above the international average (by 28% a 
year from 1940–1970), reaching 400% in 1976 and 
3000% in 1989, with no recorded levels under 90% un-
til the last decade of the twentieth century. Even today, 
Argentina is fifth in the global ranking of inflationist 
countries IMF 2019).
Mass media provides an ideal platform to ob-
serve social practices and their publicization. Accord-
ing to McCormack (2015, 135), mass-media interme-
diations “are particularly important with respects to 
efforts to govern prices.” The public dissemination of 
information is fundamental to channel moral con-
demnation and disciplinary sanctions, as well as to 
spread public numbers and coordinate social practices 
at distance. Based on a systematic archival analysis of 
the two major national newspapers – La Nación (LN) 
and Clarín (CL) – during four decades (1950–1990)2, 
this article presents the preliminary results of a long-
term history of inflation. We focus on how it was expe-
rienced, framed, and fought in the second half of the 
twentieth century in Argentina. The paper is orga-
nized in two sections that reveal contrasting modes in 
the attempts to tame prices and disentangle the econ-
omy. Each section focuses on three main aspects: the 
way inflation was experienced and presented in the 
public sphere, the actors that participated in com-
plaints and interpretations about it, and the political 
strategies followed to stabilize prices.
Collective actions and 
coercive strategies against 
a confusing problem 
A vague experience embedded in other 
socio-political concerns
Leafing through the pages of Argentinian newspapers, 
it is clear that inflation was neither the most important 
public concern nor a discernible problem for contem-
poraries in the post-war years. Of course, the sudden 
rise of prices in 1959 (reaching the unprecedented 
level of 114% a year) was portrayed in the media as a 
source of worry and uncertainty. Nevertheless, it was 
difficult to separate this anxiety from others that were 
closely linked to socio-political issues.
On the one hand, social conflict was expected 
because, for most observers, the increase in prices hit 
the working classes especially hard. In a generalized 
disruption to relative price stability, there was no 
doubt about the focus of public attention: foodstuffs, 
medicines and public services. The prices of bread, 
milk, sugar, meat, transportation, and electricity were 
among those most frequently mentioned by the press. 
For both newspapers, inflation had to be addressed to 
protect people’s wellbeing:
“The spiral of high infl ation, far from stopping is getting 
worse. (…) So fl our, tea, vegetables, powder milk, soda 
and others like meat and coff ee became unaff ordable. The 
high cost of living has become extremely alarming” (CL, 
01/27/1959: 9)3. 
“Lower classes representing the majority of our social struc-
ture only know everyday life, manifested in their salaries 
and incomes that are insuffi  cient. Even civil servants, retired 
people feel the same. People have already dramatically tight-
ened their belts” (CL, 05/09/1962: 8).
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On the other hand, the crucial question was that infla-
tion complicated governability: rising prices made it 
harder to calm down the lower classes’ belligerence in 
a very instable political regime. After the overthrow of 
Peronist government (1945–1955) by a military coup, 
the mobilizing capacity of unionized workers and 
popular associations allied to this movement became a 
threat to national authorities. For civilian govern-
ments elected under the proscription of Peronists, in-
flation encouraged military interventions. While eas-
ier for military officials, social repression was not 
without its costs. 
In this tense social climate, inflation was far 
from being a defined phenomenon. Several names 
were used to refer to this vague and disturbing experi-
ence: “carestía de la vida”, “alza del nivel de precios”, 
“círculo vicioso del encarecimiento recíproco”, “erosión 
del poder adquisitivo” o “aumento del costo de la vida”. 
Newspaper sections were not yet as clearly defined as 
they are today, but inflation could appear anywhere: 
on the front page and next to economic information, 
as well as in the union, trade, politics, sports and cul-
ture sections!
Lacking a name, there was not a widely recog-
nized index to give an accurate representation of the 
extent of inflation. Cost of living indexes had existed 
in Argentina since 1918 (Fernández López 1994) and 
different public agencies monitored price evolution, 
however none of them had been able to impose their 
measurements in the public sphere (Daniel 2013). 
Some indexes were used by trade unions to claim wage 
updates during the 1930s and 1940s (Daniel 2011). It 
was not until 1962 that most popular newspapers, like 
Clarín and La Nación, started to publish them regu-
larly. Such numbers only became significant in the 
press in the 1970s. Before, when mentioned, they 
were frequently criticized and distrusted (cf. LN, 
12/26/1965: 22).
As official numbers were surrounded by suspi-
cion, participants in public debates about inflation did 
not need to draw on any quantitative support to claim 
to have an authoritative voice on the subject. Statisti-
cal language was complementary and could appear in 
actors’ speeches without reference to the source or 
with no comment about the reliability of the numbers 
invoked. 
Damaged interests, social protests, and opposing 
interpretations
As the experience of inflation remained a confusing 
socio-political problem, with periods of rampant 
price increase and others where inflation stayed 
within moderate limits, a variety of social groups 
complained about it. Representatives of trade unions 
and employers’ associations had a leading role in ad-
vocating for an adjustment of salaries or for the au-
thorization of new prices. Housewives, taxi drivers, 
consumers of public services, local governments, and 
meat exporters all appeared mixed up on the streets 
or in newspaper articles and “open letters” explaining 
how their activities were hampered or even threat-
ened by inflation. 
Social protests were as diverse as these claim-
ants. Those led by the unions and expressed in strikes 
are the most studied. While the Confederación General 
del Trabajo was important in coordinating workers’ 
demands in the national scene during critical circum-
stances, smaller trade unions led most of the local 
complaints registered daily in the press. There are 
many examples of the vivid and creative organization 
of local communities, from neighbours’ revolts to or-
ganized movements. In La Plata city, neighbours re-
jected a rise in prices by posting the phrase “closed 
because of speculation” on every electricity meter (LN, 
03/22/1959: 3). In Corrientes, the Comisión Pro De-
fensa del Contribuyente invited shopkeepers to turn off 
the lights in their showcases and a brigade of volunteer 
electricians was organized to reconnect electricity in 
case of a cut (CL, 03/16/1959: 19).
Besides social protests, consumers developed 
three other forms of collective action: they grouped 
together to obtain better prices, boycotted retailers 
and products, and organized new distribution chan-
nels to avoid middlemen. In 1962, for example, the 
Housewives League called on “every housewife to ex-
press its solidarity with the campaign and to not buy 
potatoes until they experience a ‘fair reduction’” (LN, 
10/7/1962: 8). Some of these initiatives were con-
ducted in collaboration with public officials. The city 
of Buenos Aires, like many others, provided “sugar di-
rectly to street kiosks in order to offer lower prices 
than shops” (LN, 02/1/1959: 4). Businessmen, produc-
ers and merchants, frequently pointed to as responsi-
ble for price increases, were not passive observers of 
the disruption. Collective demonstrations and lock-
outs became their own strategies to protest against 
maximum price restrictions.
How was the price disorder understood and 
what were the recommended treatments? There was 
not a dominant interpretation of rising prices during 
the post-war years. After a period of generalized per-
plexity, in the 1960s two different interpretations be-
gan to consolidate in parallel with the circulation of 
economic theories and the organization of public con-
ferences with prestigious scholars and intellectuals. La 
Nación and Clarín became the expressions of a deep 
and wide ideological divide in Argentinian society.4 
For liberals such as La Nación, inflation was 
much more important than for “desarrollistas” like 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter Volume 20 · Number 2 · March 2019
9The taming of prices by Mariana Heredia and Claudia Daniel
Clarín. In the former publication, the volume of arti-
cles dedicated to the subject was higher and the num-
ber of editorials double that of its competitor. From a 
liberal perspective, the state should be blamed for 
monetary disorder and its main responsibility was to 
restore the value of the national currency. From very 
early on, the editorial line was against price control 
(LN, 01/13/1962: 6) and any state intervention in 
markets and individual enterprise. Particularly wor-
ried about inflation, La Nación stressed its conse-
quences for investments and private companies and, 
according to an editorial (01/24/1959: 4), the solution 
was “to withdraw politics from the economy … money 
will have value once it can be supported in everybo-
dy’s productive labor. The rest is just an alchemy of 
paper and ink, an alchemy as fictitious as medieval 
magicians”. Public expenditure was pointed to as the 
main cause of inflation and public austerity was de-
manded daily. 
On the contrary, for Clarín, the rise of prices 
was related to the underdevelopment of the country 
and should be solved, in the long term, by a national 
take-off, associated with industrialization and eco-
nomic autarchy. Clarín underlined the consequences 
of inflation for people’s wellbeing and asked for pa-
tience while persisting in the efforts for development. 
In a 1966 editorial, the journal expressed the opinion 
that “ … printing money is not always something bad. 
When it gives companies the required conditions to 
produce, it can certainly be good.” (CL, 02/23/1966: 8)
High-ranking public officials were everyday 
characters in the press, while there was little space for 
experts. Newspapers articles quoted the explanations 
of the former very respectfully, reserving the editorial 
section only for their interpretations. But, when econ-
omists did appear, far from showing a unique and 
original interpretation, they simply reproduced the 
opposing perspectives previously presented.
Moral judgments and physical violence as 
a stabilizing strategy 
Faced with the instability of prices and the belliger-
ence of social groups, authorities switched between 
two main strategies. Interventionist governments 
called “price commissions” and studied prices and 
productive chains in order to fix the “real” value of 
goods and services. Liberal ministries preferred to set 
prices free and re-establish the laws of supply and de-
mand. 
The two orientations faced critics, opposing 
both the “fair” and “unfair” determination of prices. 
People expected “socially fair behavior” from their 
providers and accused them of making arbitrary deci-
sions. Producers and merchants denounced the “lack 
of reality” of state standards. Intense debates about 
“maximum prices” or “liberalized prices” illustrate the 
hybrid nature of inflation. As price disorder concerned 
private providers and public authorities at the same 
time, responsibility was hard to define. 
This troublesome phenomenon not only con-
fronted citizens. The authorities also accused specula-
tors and invoked the possibility of severe punishment. 
The idea that rising prices were caused by or at least 
propagated by opportunists lay behind this public 
prosecution and social belligerence. The allegations 
against speculative selling maneuvers – through 
prices, hiding of goods and merchandise stockpiling 
– were frequent in 1959 and 1962. Public repression of 
“speculators and loan sharks” was demanded, while 
denouncing an “abusive regime created by those who 
take advantage of people starvation.” (CL, 02/25/1959: 
15) Those who adopted these kind of practices were 
considered unscrupulous salesmen or “dishonest and 
antisocial” businessmen (CL, 07/16/1959: 10) and 
strong disapproval was expressed of those “playing 
with inflation.” (LN, 05/16/1962: 1) References to 
common good were also evoked, particularly when 
competition over distribution seemed to slip into self-
ish sector disputes.
As speculative practices and speculators re-
ceived clear and strong public denunciation, severe 
intervention and even the recourse to physical vio-
lence was permitted. On the one hand, there was a 
state of intense social revolt: consumers protested 
against merchants, families refused to pay certain bills, 
unions asked their bases to stay “alert and mobilized,” 
authorities from different municipalities declared the 
suspension of payments to resist the adjustments. On 
the other hand, many volunteer inspectors offered to 
monitor the price of selected goods. Producers and 
merchants were horrified by this civil control of their 
activities and denounced the arbitrariness of the in-
spections. Merchants claimed that repressive state acts 
against inflation should not include small shops. From 
their point of view, controls should focus on “big 
fishes”: wholesalers and distribution companies. The 
Federación de Centros de Almaceneros (grouping of 
grocers), deplored that “we are sending grocers to 
Villa Devoto (a prison).” They assured the public that 
“an omnipotent State is violating the basic rights of 
honest citizens.” (CL, 07/13/1959: 19)
Physical intimidation was not the prerogative of 
any political regime: civil as well as military govern-
ments adopted different strategies to threaten specula-
tors and control prices. Exceptional procedures were 
admitted in the context of the “State of Siege” declared 
by president Frondizi (1958–1962): in 1959, authori-
ties could force sellers to offer their stocks at fixed 
prices. In other measures, under stabilizing strategies 
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based on direct or indirect control of prices, producers 
were required to communicate their prices in advance 
to the authorities and to obtain authorization for pos-
sible adjustments. Price controls became so frequent5 
that they led to a learning process of adaptive behav-
iors for businessmen, public officials, and consumers 
(FIEL 1990, 8) In 1972, newspapers published a list of 
companies that had not respected the fixed prices as a 
method of public calling to account (CL, 05/19/1972: 
16 and LN, 05/19/1972: 1).
Despite the predominance of coercive strategies 
to fight inflation, there was still no agreement about 
their efficiency. The repressive interventions in coffee 
houses, shops, hotels, restaurants were disseminated 
by newspapers, even if suspicion about the measures 
persisted. The success of these actions was questioned 
(especially by liberal observers who insisted on the 
pursuance of fiscal deficit), thereby weakening public 
support for the authorities. As an alternative, liberals 
promoted “economic freedom” and “competition”.
Experts and numbers to 
re-establish “economic” stability
A long illness with measurable symptoms and 
individual antibodies
For many years, authorities managed to keep inflation 
rates relatively contained and the presentation of ris-
ing prices remained confusing, wide open to interpre-
tations and complaint by laypeople. Things changed in 
1975. The austerity plan of the Peronist Economic 
Minister Rodrigo provoked an unprecedented quanti-
tative leap: the annual price increase climbed and 
stayed in three digits. As a result, stabilization objec-
tives concentrated the attention and actions of public 
authorities, leaving other concerns such as develop-
ment or distribution in the background. Inflation was 
considered a threat to the bases of the economic and 
social order and, once the military were back in gov-
ernment in 1976, its eradication became an absolute 
priority (Fridman 2010; Heredia 2015). Biological 
metaphors proliferated and newspaper editorials em-
phasized that inflation was long an Argentinian illness 
that had deeply affected the institutional body of the 
Republic (LN, 08/17/81: 6). Under the new authoritar-
ian regime, social protests, labour conflict, and guer-
rilla actions were subject to censorship and lost the 
attention of journalists, being replaced by accounts of 
economic policies and the difficulty of curbing prices. 
After the democratic transition of 1983, inflation re-
mained a top priority for authorities until 1991.
The most popular Argentinian price index 
(Consumer Price Index, CPI) had to wait until 1975 
for its celebrity. Since then, La Nación, like Clarín, 
started to publish it every month, drawing attention to 
controversies around the index (CL, 04/16/78: 1) and 
informing readers about its construction criteria (LN, 
01/24/82: 1). The relevance of numbers became un-
challenged, beyond doubt, and journalists considered 
their usefulness in calculating other values, taking 
into account their accuracy. As indexes succeeded in 
being considered as the “thermometers” of inflation, 
they quickly began to nourish social expectancy. On 
the one hand, newspapers competed for the scoop by 
trying to anticipate the results before the official calcu-
lation was finished (CL, 06/26/1975: 10) or publicly 
estimating its probable value (LN, 2/1/1972: 13). On 
the other hand, public polls revealed and nourished 
growing social anxiety about the topic. Regardless of 
their ideological orientation, both newspapers cele-
brated the attention given to inflation, considering 
that rising prices were “the number one enemy” to be 
fought (CL, 04/21/85: 1). 
But social anxiety was now related to a new rep-
ertory of actions, associated with lessons learned from 
inflation and the development of “antibodies” to infla-
tion. Compared to the collective actions showed by 
newspapers in the late 1950s, what is astonishing – es-
pecially since the 1970s – is the growing importance of 
individual strategies to confront inflation. From the 
mid-1970s, moral and imperative judgments were 
progressively replaced by “neutral” descriptions and 
later on by the provision of information used by read-
ers to protect themselves or take advantage of the price 
disorder.
Journals were given new tasks. Since 1978, La 
Nación had a section called “rent office” to teach own-
ers and tenants how to agree their rental contracts and 
another one called “City beats” to provide daily finan-
cial information to their readers. Advertising also re-
inforced strategies that had already been adopted, but 
now appealed to atomized individuals and rational 
private actions rather than collective forces). The 
Chamber of Supermarkets and Consumers, for exam-
ple, published price lists in newspapers. According to 
them, “Consumers can do more than complain about 
inflation. … Every Thursday we will provide a weekly 
guide. You will be able to compare and buy at fair 
prices. With higher participation, inflation will be re-
duced.” (CL, 05/30/85: 14).
Collective strategies of defense were gradually 
replaced by a generalized search for “microeconomic 
salvation” (Juan Llach quoted in Botana and Waldman 
1988, 96). The press portrayed individual behaviours 
that show that protection and speculation were no 
longer distinguished: butchers avoided popular meat 
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cuts because they provided no real gain (CL, 5/8/1972: 
15), merchants adopted “preventive price rises” for 
popular goods that barely reached shop shelves (CL, 
09/15/1972: 11); long queues were organized to buy 
food (CL, 7/6/1975: 20) or to anticipate rises in the 
price of petrol (LN, 6/1/1975: 14). In more technical 
terms, journalists described the preventive real-estate 
investments as an option for discouraged savers (CL, 
11/8/1975: 30). As suggested by an editorial of La 
Nación, “with inflation everybody ends up speculat-
ing, each one within his or her possibilities.” (LN, 
2/3/1972: 6)
Some skilled and ambitious Argentines had also 
learnt to play highly sophisticated and short-term fi-
nancial games. Responding to government stimuli, 
savers placed their money at very high rates to obtain 
profits (LN, 3/6/82; LN, 1/14/85, CL, 1/19/85). Never-
theless, sooner or later, Argentines placed more reli-
ance in the US Dollar than in the Argentinian cur-
rency and local banks. Newspapers showed repeatedly 
the “desperate search of the parallel dollar that values 
the double of the official price … as well as the exis-
tence of a black market that enriches speculators.” 
(LN, 4/28/75: 4) “From the less important economic 
agent to the biggest businessman, we all consider that 
the free dollar is the lighthouse indicating advantages 
and risks.” (CL, 4/20/89: 3) The humorous sections of 
the newspapers illustrated many individual strategies 
to take advantage of inflation. In 1981 (LN, 7/9/1981: 
12), a little man in a cartoon affirmed:
–  “As I am Argentine, I will sign the contract in national 
currency. 
–  And what will you do with your salary?
–  I will buy dollars.”
The appearance of new actors and the 
authority of experts
Trade unions and social movements did not disappear 
from newspaper pages, but shared their importance 
with actors of a very different nature. As Fridman 
(2010) has shown, much energy was devoted to creat-
ing associations of consumers and to promoting peda-
gogic campaigns to shape a new economic mentality 
and try to discipline prices. Compared to previous 
consumer organization, the new consumers had no re-
pressive powers but decided, through their individual 
and independent “economic” actions (purchase, infor-
mation publishing, boycotts), how to punish or reward 
their providers.
Newspapers show the growing importance of 
this consumer figure: “The opinion of consumers or-
ganically established could become one of the most 
important to face efficiently this hard economic prob-
lem.” (CL, 9/5/1972: 14) When the Consumers Coun-
cil of the Metropolitan Area was created in 1972, the 
Commerce Secretary gave an active role in price fixing 
to consumers: the Council had the remit of “watching 
out for the production, marketing and distribution of 
goods and services satisfying common peoples’ needs 
as well as any negative practice against fair competi-
tion.” (LN, 7/13/72: 1) Advertisements and open let-
ters from the Secretary of Commerce reveal the im-
portance attributed to the consumer: “Buy better: plan 
your purchases + compare prices + note good shops + 
calculate = you will have an additional salary.” (LN, 
7/7/1972: 11)
As another expression of the dilution of collec-
tive actors, a new type of expert emerged. By the 1980s, 
both newspapers started to include contributions from 
younger experts belonging to a different generation of 
economist than the ones who had regularly expressed 
opposing ideological perspectives. They informed the 
public about economic variables and forecasts and 
judged the economic situation. From a historical per-
spective, the growing importance of media profes-
sionals and academic economists was concomitant to 
the retreat of social representatives and ideologues. In 
1959, a businessman participating in a discussion or-
ganized by La Nación could regret the “lack of scien-
tific rigour to investigate [the] issues [of economy]” 
asking for “technical criteria for effective conclusions.” 
(LN, 7/19/1959: 10) Thirty years later, his wish had 
been granted. Discussions of inflation were practically 
monopolized by economists, most of them with no or-
ganic relation to specific businesses, trade unions or 
the state. In the 1970s these economists introduced 
technical terms that went hand in hand with a new 
rhetoric: numbers appeared as an instrument that 
could provide neutral (non ideologically-driven) bases 
for public discussions and experts affirmed their par-
ticipation in public debate as impartial analysts of na-
tional reality. 
The rise of experts is also clear in the role of 
public policy-makers. While during the dictatorship 
the first young consultants were called upon to assist 
authorities and gained a certain public interest, “inde-
pendent” experts (external to political parties) were 
considered to be in the best position to understand 
and solve instability in the civil administrations of the 
1980s. La Nación asked several times that profession-
als should be recruited for main governmental posi-
tions (LN, 7/6/1985: 14). References to “technocrats”, 
“professionals”, “experts” appeared when discussing 
economic policy making (see for example: CL, 
2/24/1985: 12). The rise of experts was strongly associ-
ated with the growing importance of foreign advisors 
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and creditors. “International opinion” about the nom-
ination of economic authorities or the orientation of 
domestic economic policy was therefore also men-
tioned (CL, 2/20/1985: 7 y 2/21/1985: 20).
The strict respecting of expert authority, even 
among lay citizens, became the way opposing social 
perspectives were disqualified. With the dominance of 
liberal perspectives, journalists, entrepreneurs, and 
governments could ask social leaders to accept spe-
cialists’ diagnoses and treatments, even if they re-
quired deep sacrifices.
The coordination of expectations as a solution 
from a distance
The long experience of inflation, as Clarín, La Nación 
and their columnists reminded readers, was now pre-
sented as a sign of governments’ inefficiency. From the 
1970s on, instead of referring to social conflict or un-
derdevelopment constraints as causes of inflation, 
journalists of both newspapers started to focus on the 
state’s faults and the inability of public officials to ex-
plain (and manage) the rise of prices. As shapers of 
public opinion, newspapers began to use the CPI as a 
test for public policies. Having illustrated the rise of 
several prices, an editorial of Clarín concluded, “con-
trols and so-called voluntary bilateral agreements have 
been revealed to be totally inefficient because they do 
not attack the powerhouses of inflation.” (CL, 
4/17/1972: 10)
Compared to the public debates in the 1950s 
that had pointed out several causes, public discourse 
in the 1970s and 1980s assumed that the state was di-
rectly or indirectly responsible for the disarray, install-
ing the liberal perspective as common sense. In an ed-
itorial, La Nación insisted on “…lack of proficiency [of 
authorities] to conduct economic issues in a serious 
and efficient way.” (LN, 1/8/1972: 8) Clarín, which had 
always supported interventionist policies, accorded 
with part of the diagnosis. In an editorial titled “The 
problem of prices”, it affirmed: “the measures adopted 
by the government are insufficient and inefficient be-
cause they do not face the problem deeply … They 
want to solve an economic problem with legal laws. 
Government had no authority over markets. With le-
gal laws, it is impossible to correct the problem of dis-
investment and production insufficiency.” (CL, 
7/3/1972: 10) 
If physical violence seemed to be acceptable in 
the 1950s and 1960s to control prices, since the mid-
1970s authorities had concluded that the challenge 
was to coordinate expectations. Neither the officials of 
the 1976 dictatorship nor the civil governments after 
1983 considered the possibility of punishing produc-
ers, merchants, or financial speculators. Instead of 
monitoring and discouraging selfish practices, author-
ities decided to coordinate them. As can be seen in 
Economic Ministers’ speeches, authorities looked for a 
“convergence of efforts between the public and the pri-
vate sector to achieve the outcomes and results we are 
exposing.” (Martínez de Hoz in LN, 12/21/78: 1).
Therefore, newspaper articles not only informed 
their readership about developments in the prices of 
basic goods but also regularly included accounts of the 
sophisticated discourses of Economic Ministers and 
financial information (in particular the exchange rate 
and the interest rate) in their pages. In addition to the 
examination of the consequences of economic public 
policy for the country and its different social groups, 
there were financial analysts teaching readers how to 
understand economic information and, especially, 
how to act rationally using it. Their intention was not 
to judge the virtues of public decisions but to instruct 
economic agents in the maximization of their incomes 
and saving.
After decades of moral judgment (now limited 
to public interventions by the Catholic Church), 
speculative practices could be recognised and even de-
fended in the public sphere: 
When someone had the possibility of making huge economic 
gains with low risk is too much to ask not to envoy this profi t 
with the argument that it is bad for the country because he 
is becoming a parasite speculator (…) the devil speculators 
just enjoy what is given to them on the platter for mistaken 
policies (…) It is essential then … to fi nish once for all with 
fi scal imbalance. Once this done, we will also fi nish with the 
patria fi nanciera. (Roberto Bullrich, LN, 3/24/90: 12)
Final remarks
Socio-historical analysis of inflation allowed us to 
show a transition between two ways of fighting social 
problems and managing population. Our main con-
clusion is that, since 1970s, inflation not only rose as 
measured by its annual rates, it also became an in-
creasingly precise public concern, framed and treated 
in a brand new way with the help of numbers and ex-
perts. From the 1950s to the 1970s, inflation was pre-
sented as a social and political phenomenon, inter-
mingled with other sources of popular contention. 
There were a plurality of actors (social leaders, politi-
cians, newspapers) vying for interpretations and solu-
tions to price increases, rooted in diverse and conflict-
ing representations of the economy. In this regime, we 
find public interventions led to physical and even vio-
lent expressions in the public sphere. From the mid-
1970s, when inflation skyrocketed to three digits per 
year, its framing changed. Inflation was now linked to 
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a unified statistic (CPI) and considered an economic 
problem. At the same time, it became the domain of 
economic expertise, involving all members of society 
with no further distinctions, requiring an aseptic in-
tervention from a distance based on the recognition of 
individual freedom and the management of decentral-
ized calculations.
The diffusion and acceptance of the national in-
dex CPI enabled people to have a common measure to 
follow and adjust local and singular prices. This num-
ber allowed abstraction (in the sense of disentangle-
ment for singular goods and agents), generalization 
(in the sense of creating a common experience across 
different national population and territories), as well 
as de-territorialisation of control and coordination (in 
the sense of fixing expectations to govern them at a 
distance). At the same time, with mathematical tools 
on hand, economists could participate in the public 
sphere with an accuracy and authority unreached by 
other actors. Thanks to numbers, they could appear as 
impartial and efficient mediators even if members of 
the professional community were involved in the deci-
sion-making process behind very unpopular and even 
ineffective policies.
Most studies about inflation are focused on the 
later period; the in-depth analyses of the post-war 
years provide a contrasting point of reference to high-
light Foucault’s argument that the rise of neoliberalism 
was linked to a new pattern of government. At least for 
the economy, from then on, moral judgments and 
physical violence were replaced by the respect for and 
coordination of selfish individual practices.
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